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The Indiscretion of Friends: Fourth 
Amendment Concerns About the Ability to 
Predict a Person’s Online Social Activity 
by Monitoring Her Contacts 
George M. Dery III* 
ABSTRACT: 
This Article considers new predictive surveillance technology 
that could enable social media companies, as well as law 
enforcement agencies, to predict a person’s future behavior based 
solely on an examination of the person’s contacts. Employing the 
tools of information theory, scientists at the University of 
Vermont and the University of Adelaide have been able to predict 
Twitter users’ future behavior by scrutinizing only the responses 
of their contacts. This technological advance, which can be 
applied to other kinds of social media, raises the prospect of law 
enforcement gaining insight into the future behavior of social 
media users even if such targets choose to withdraw from social 
media. This Article analyzes the strength of potential arguments 
for Fourth Amendment protection against this possibility. If 
subjects of predictive surveillance argue that communications 
with their contacts should be off limits to law enforcement, 
precedent regarding disclosures by confidants to police indicates 
these contentions will likely fail. However, the “target” theory of 
standing, previously rejected by the Supreme Court, might allow 
claims of Fourth Amendment violations in the unique context of 
predictive surveillance. Finally, the strongest argument for 
protection against government scrutiny of contacts to predict a 
person’s future social media behavior would combine the Fourth 
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Amendment rights of a homeowner with recent Court rulings 
extending privacy protection to digital information. 
 
Abstract: .............................................................................. 137 
I. Introduction ............................................................. 139 
II. Defining a Fourth Amendment “Search” ............... 141 
III. Predicting a Person’s Activity Simply by Studying 
Her Social Media Contacts ...................................... 142 
IV. Potential Arguments for Fourth Amendment Privacy 
Protection Against the Predictive Surveillance of 
Anticipating a Social Media User’s Behavior by 
Monitoring Her Contacts ........................................ 145 
A. Subjects of Predictive Surveillance Will Likely 
Be Unable to Argue Fourth Amendment Privacy 
for Communications with Friends Since the 
Supreme Court Has Repeatedly Refused to 
Protect Disclosures Made by Friends .............. 145 
B. A Former User of Social Media Claiming Fourth 
Amendment Privacy Against Government 
Exploitation of Her Contacts Could Resurrect 
“Target” Standing as Particularly Apt for 
Predictive Surveillance .................................... 150 
C. A Reinterpretation of Court Precedent 
Regarding a Homeowner’s Right to Privacy, 
when Viewed with Court Rulings on Collection 
of Digital Information, Could Provide the 
Strongest Argument for Fourth Amendment 
Protection Against Predictive Surveillance of 
Social Media ...................................................... 154 










2020] THE INDISCRETION OF FRIENDS 139 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Have you grown weary of the privacy invasions of social 
media? Perhaps you were appalled by Facebook’s collection of 
“sensitive personal information about sexual orientation, race, 
gender, even intelligence and childhood trauma” from some of its 
users.1 Maybe you were alarmed by the proposed $5.3 million 
settlement by such Internet giants as Instagram, Twitter, and 
Yelp regarding a privacy lawsuit.2 After such revelations, the 
prudent course might be to simply opt out of social media. The 
loss of connections, updates, and entertainment, however 
isolating, would be the necessary cost of preserving your privacy. 
While such a decision might be wise and even laudable, it would 
also come too late. 
Researchers from the University of Vermont and the 
University of Adelaide report that limiting the use of social 
media and even completely deleting accounts provide “no 
guarantee of privacy.”3 Employing “tools from information 
theory,” James P. Bagrow, Xipei Liu, and Lewis Mitchell were 
able to “repeatedly and accurately predict the text” of Twitter 
users by focusing only on the “social ties” of a user, rather than 
accessing the user’s own data.4 Essentially, these computer 
scientists have demonstrated that “the Twitter streams of your 
[ten] closest contacts can predict your future tweets even better 
than your own stream.”5 Further, even though this particular 
research focused on Twitter, Bagrow warned, “the same 
information could be gathered from posts on other social media, 
 
 1. Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham-Harrison, How Cambridge 
Analytica Turned Facebook ‘Likes’ into A Lucrative Political Tool, THE 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2018, 9:02 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/17/facebook-cambridge 
-analytica-kogan-data-algorithm. 
 2. Jeff J. Roberts, Instagram, Twitter, and Others Could Pay Users $5.3 
Million in App Privacy Settlement, FORTUNE (Apr. 4, 2017, 10:53 PM), 
http://fortune.com/2017/04/04/find-friends-privacy-instagram-twitter/. 
 3. Matthew Hutson, People Can Predict Your Tweets—Even If You Aren’t 
on Twitter, SCI. (Jan. 21, 2019, 11:00 AM), https:// 
www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/01/people-can-predict-your-tweets-even-if-
you-aren-t-twitter. 
 4. James P. Bagrow, Xipei Liu & Lewis Mitchell, Information Flow 
Reveals Prediction Limits in Online Social Activity, 3 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 
122, 126 (2019). 
 5. Hutson, supra note 3. 
140 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 21:1 
 
like Facebook.”6 Bagrow’s coauthor, Lewis Mitchell, simply said, 
“There’s no place to hide in a social network.”7 
The prospect of social media companies or law enforcement 
being able to build predictive profiles based solely on one’s 
contacts has troubling Fourth Amendment implications.8 Can 
any person reasonably expect privacy when using social media, 
or even after leaving such platforms, when “a person’s choices 
and identity are embedded” in these social media services?9 
Must Fourth Amendment protection be simply abandoned as 
part of the price of functioning in a “highly networked 
society[?]”10 
This Article reviews Supreme Court precedent to consider 
arguments that the Fourth Amendment protects against 
predictive surveillance by law enforcement of social media 
contacts in order to divine the future behavior of a user or former 
user. The prior case law indicates that while some contentions 
will not convince the Court, others could present a path to 
Fourth Amendment protection for those using social media. This 
Article begins, in Part II, with a review of the Court’s definition 
of a Fourth Amendment “search.” Part III provides an 
examination of the technology behind predictive surveillance. 
Finally, Part IV analyzes the strength of the potential 
arguments advocating for Fourth Amendment protection from 
this new technology. If those subject to predictive surveillance 
argue that their communications with friends and other contacts 
should be off-limits to law enforcement, precedent regarding 
disclosures by friends to police would indicate these contentions 
likely fail. However, the “target” theory of standing, previously 
rejected by the Court, might allow claims of Fourth Amendment 
 
 6. Umberto Bacchi, ‘No Place to Hide’: Twitter Contacts Give Your 
Preferences Away, Study Finds, THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. (Jan. 21, 2019, 6:59 
PM), http://news.trust.org/item/20190121185119-yg73i/. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
 9. Joshua E. Brown, Study: On Facebook and Twitter Your Privacy Is at 
Risk—Even If You Don’t Have an Account, UVM TODAY (Jan. 21, 2019), 
https://www.uvm.edu/uvmnews/news/study-facebook-and-twitter-your 
-privacy-risk-even-if-you-dont-have-account. 
 10. Id. 
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violations in the unique context of predictive surveillance. 
Finally, the strongest argument might combine the Fourth 
Amendment rights of a homeowner with recent Court rulings 
extending privacy protection to digital information. 
II. DEFINING A FOURTH AMENDMENT “SEARCH” 
As with any law, the Fourth Amendment can only be 
violated if it applies in the first place. By its own terms, the 
Fourth Amendment applies only to “searches and seizures.”11 
The Court provided a definition of a Fourth Amendment “search” 
in Katz v. United States, a case in which federal agents placed 
“an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the 
public telephone booth” from which Katz placed a phone call.12 
This electronic device enabled the government to collect Katz’s 
side of a conversation in which he illegally transmitted 
“wagering information” in violation of federal law.13 The Court 
ruled that the agents’ “activities in electronically listening to and 
recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which 
he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth” and 
therefore amounted to a Fourth Amendment “search.”14 
Katz supported its conclusion with ringing language, 
declaring that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places.”15 The Court proclaimed, “Wherever a man may be, he is 
entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”16 Recognizing “the vital role that the 
public telephone has come to play in private communication,” 
Katz concluded that anyone who occupies a phone booth “shuts 
the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place 
a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into 
the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.”17 
 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 12. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967). But see United States 
v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012) (recognizing when the government 
“physically occupie[s] private property for the purpose of obtaining information” 
as a second definition of a Fourth Amendment search). Since the technology 
analyzed in this article will not necessitate such a physical trespass, Jones’ 
definition is beyond the scope of this article. Further, analysis of Fourth 
Amendment “seizures” is also beyond the scope of this article. 
 13. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
 14. Id. at 353. 
 15. Id. at 351. 
 16. Id. at 359. 
 17. Id. at 352. 
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The Katz court spoke in such broad strokes that it provided 
few specifics for a workable rule. Justice Harlan, in his 
concurrence, wrote separately to address this problem. He noted: 
“As the Court’s opinion states, ‘the Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places.’”18 The Court’s declaration, however, left 
unanswered “what protection” the Fourth amendment “affords 
to those people.”19 Justice Harlan proposed the following 
clarifying guidance: “My understanding of the rule that has 
emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold 
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”20 For example, “a man’s home is, for most 
purposes, a place where he expects privacy.”21 In contrast, 
“conversations in the open would not be protected against being 
overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the 
circumstances would be unreasonable.”22 Following Justice 
Harlan’s formulation, the “Court uniformly has held that the 
application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the 
person invoking its protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a 
‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been 
invaded by government action.”23 Indeed, the Court would come 
to label Katz’s definition of a Fourth Amendment search as its 
“touchstone.”24 
III. PREDICTING A PERSON’S ACTIVITY SIMPLY BY 
STUDYING HER SOCIAL MEDIA CONTACTS 
Bagrow, Liu, and Mitchell considered the feasibility of 
predicting a Twitter user’s future communications by analyzing 
her closest contacts’ tweets.25 They began their “second-hand 
surveillance”26 of people’s online behavior by randomly sampling 
 
 18. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). 
 24. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984). 
 25. See generally Bagrow, Liu & Mitchell, supra note 4 at 122 (using 
“information theoretic tools to estimate the predictive information in the 
writings of Twitter users”). 
 26. Hutson, supra note 3. 
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Twitter during April 2014.27 The researchers sampled 927 
Twitter users who tweeted in English, had been active for “at 
least a [one]-year period[,]” and who had “50 [to] 500 followers.”28 
The cutoff of those accounts below fifty followers avoided 
“inactive and bot accounts” while the cutoff above 500 followers 
steered clear of “unusually popular” outliers “such as celebrity 
accounts.”29 The scientists collected all of the “public postings,” 
excluding retweets, of their 927 users, whom they labeled as 
“egos.”30 An examination of these tweets enabled the researchers 
to identify their 927 egos’ top fifteen Twitter followers.31 The 
researchers, deeming these 13,905 followers as “alters,” 
gathered their tweets as well.32 
The researchers aimed to predict the written text of their 
927 egos, noting that “[r]epeated, accurate predictions of future 
words indicate that the available information can be used to 
build profiles and predictive models of a user.”33 In estimating 
“how predictable a person’s future words would be,” the 
researchers used “a measurement known as entropy.”34 Entropy 
can limit predictability because “more entropy means more 
randomness and less repetition.”35 To put the Twitter users’ 
entropy rates in context, the researchers measured the entropy 
rates of writing in “formal text,” such as that of Ernest 
Hemingway and James Joyce.36 “On [a]verage,” the 927 Twitter 
users “had more entropy than Ernest Hemingway” and “less 
 
 27. Bagrow, Liu & Mitchell, supra note 4, at 126. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 122. 
 31. See id. (“Each of the n=927 ego-networks consisted of one user (the ego) 
and their [fifteen] most frequently mentioned Twitter contacts  
(the alters) . . . .”). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 123. The study’s authors explain that “[t]he ability . . . to 
accurately profile [and predict] individuals . . . is reflected in the predictability 
of their written text.”). Id at 126. 
 34. Hutson, supra note 3. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. The scientists measured Hemingway’s For Whom the Bell Tolls and 
Joyce’s Ulysses. They also measured the entropy rates of Thomas Pynchon’s 
Gravity’s Rainbow and J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Fellowship of the Ring. James P. 
Bagrow, Xipei Liu, & Lewis Mitchell, Supplementary Information for 
“Information Flow Reveals Prediction Limits in Online Social Activity” at 
Supplementary Table 1, https://bagrow.com/pdf/information-flow-reveals 
-bagrow-2019_supp.pdf. 
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than James Joyce.”37 The study’s authors then combined the 
entropy measurement with “a tool from information theory 
called Fano’s inequality” to “calculate how well a person’s stream 
could predict the first word in his or her next tweet.”38 In 
considering the user/ego’s tweets, the upper boundary on 
accuracy “for predicting a given word out of (approximately) 
5000 possible words on average” was about fifty-three percent 
which the researchers deemed “quite high.”39 
The researchers then assessed the predictability of a user’s 
next word when considering both the user/ego’s Twitter stream 
and the streams of the user’s fifteen closest contacts/alters.40 The 
predictability when considering both the user and her contacts 
rose to sixty percent.41 When the user’s stream was removed, 
leaving the researchers with only the contacts’/alters’ streams to 
use as a basis of prediction, predictability dropped to fifty-seven 
percent.42 Importantly, the accuracy obtained by using the 
contacts’ tweets alone was greater than that obtained by simply 
observing the ego’s tweets. Bagrow noted: “Paradoxically, this 
indicated that there is potentially more information about the 
ego within the total set of alters than within the ego itself.”43 
The study’s authors thus found that “meaningful predictive 
information about individuals is encoded in their social ties.”44 
The researchers declared, “there is so much social information 
that an entity with access to all social media data” will have only 
slightly less predictive ability when having access to a person’s 
Twitter contacts than with access to both those contacts and the 
user herself.45 The investigators explicitly warned that their 
work “may have distinct implications for privacy” because “if an 
individual forgoes using a social media platform or deletes their 
account, yet their social ties remain, then that platform owner 
potentially still possesses 95.1±3.36% of the achievable 
predictive accuracy of the future activities of that individual.”46 
 
 37. Hutson, supra note 3. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Bagrow, Liu & Mitchell, supra note 4, at 123. Hutson, supra note 3. 
 40. Hutson, supra note 3. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Bagrow, Liu & Mitchell, supra note 4, at 124.  
 44. Id. at 122. 
 45. Id. at 125. 
 46. Id. 
2020] THE INDISCRETION OF FRIENDS 145 
 
Bagrow has sounded the alarm, noting, “[w]hat concerns me 
in terms of privacy . . . is that there are so many ways that 
[social media] platforms are getting at data that I think people 
don’t realize.”47 Joanne Hinds, a psychologist at the University 
of Bath in the United Kingdom, has asserted, “[w]e have barely 
scratched the surface of what types of information can be 
revealed” through contacts.48 The University of Vermont, on its 
website, went so far as to state that “privacy on social media is 
like second-hand smoke. It’s controlled by the people around 
you.”49 Privacy on social media is therefore no longer within the 
control of the individual. As Bagrow warned, “[y]ou alone don’t 
control your privacy on social media platforms, . . . [y]our friends 
have a say too.”50 
IV. POTENTIAL ARGUMENTS FOR FOURTH 
AMENDMENT PRIVACY PROTECTION AGAINST THE 
PREDICTIVE SURVEILLANCE OF ANTICIPATING A 
SOCIAL MEDIA USER’S BEHAVIOR BY MONITORING HER 
CONTACTS 
A. SUBJECTS OF PREDICTIVE SURVEILLANCE WILL LIKELY BE 
UNABLE TO ARGUE FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY FOR 
COMMUNICATIONS WITH FRIENDS SINCE THE SUPREME COURT 
HAS REPEATEDLY REFUSED TO PROTECT DISCLOSURES MADE BY 
FRIENDS 
People seeking Fourth Amendment protection from 
predictive surveillance online must first overcome a profound 
stumbling block—the fact that they have undermined their own 
privacy by involving themselves in social media in the first place. 
Katz, the “lodestar” guiding the Court’s perception of privacy,51 
held, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in 
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”52 There is a sense, however, that what one confides 
to a friend should be kept secret. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of 
friendship is the ability to unburden oneself to a friend, knowing 
 
 47. Hutson, supra note 3. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Brown, supra note 9. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979). 
 52. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (citing Lewis v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)). 
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that any indiscretion discussed is safely sealed within the 
bounds of that private relationship. 
The Court does not share this view of friendship. It has ruled 
that the act of sharing information, even with one’s friend, 
destroys the privacy of the shared secret.53 The Court considered 
the privacy among old acquaintances in On Lee v. United States, 
a case in which Chin Poy, a former employee, visited On Lee’s 
laundry for a chat.54 Unaware that Chin Poy, armed with a 
microphone, was operating as an undercover agent for the 
Narcotics Bureau, On Lee made incriminating statements.55 
When these admissions were later offered against him, On Lee 
argued that they must be suppressed as obtained in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment.56 The Court disagreed, finding no 
Fourth Amendment violation because On Lee “was talking 
confidentially and indiscreetly with one he trusted, and he was 
overheard.”57 Chin Poy’s use of technology, here a radio 
transmitter to broadcast On Lee’s statements, made privacy 
among co-criminals no less of a “spurious libert[y].”58 Thus, 
government use of technology did not provoke Fourth 
Amendment protection from a false friend.59 
The Court again denied protection for statements 
improvidently shared with colleagues in Hoffa v. United States.60 
In Hoffa, Teamsters Union President Jimmy Hoffa openly spoke 
of bribing jurors in front of Ed Partin, a union official who Hoffa 
had invited into his hotel room, the hotel lobby, and the 
 
 53. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 753–54 (1952) (holding no 
Fourth Amendment violation when agent Lee overheard Petitioner talking 
“confidentially and indiscreetly with one he trusted,” even though agent Lee 
overheard with the help of a transmitter and receiver). 
 54. Id. at 749. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 750. 
 57. Id. at 753–54. 
 58. Id. at 754. 
 59. See id. at 754 (refusing to treat the use of transmitter and radio as 
wiretapping and, ultimately, finding no Fourth Amendment violation). See also 
id. (“The use of bifocals, field glasses or the telescope to magnify the object of a 
witness’ vision is not a forbidden search or seizure, even if they focus without 
his knowledge or consent upon what one supposes to be private indiscretions.”). 
 60. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (holding no Fourth 
Amendment violation because Petitioner “was not relying on the security of the 
hotel room; he was relying upon his misplaced confidence that Partin would not 
reveal his wrongdoing”). 
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courthouse.61 When Partin later testified at Hoffa’s juror 
tampering trial as to what he heard while undercover,62 Hoffa 
claimed such evidence was gathered in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.63 In considering Hoffa’s contention, the Court 
waxed philosophical: “The risk of being . . . betrayed by an 
informer or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one 
deals is probably inherent in the conditions of human society. It 
is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak.”64 
The Court further noted: “Partin was in the suite by invitation, 
and every conversation which he heard was either directed to 
him or knowingly carried on in his presence.”65 Since Hoffa had 
therefore simply formed a “misplaced belief” that his hearer 
would not reveal his wrongdoing, he had “no interest 
legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment” in the case.66 
The Court, once again, refused Fourth Amendment 
protection to statements made to a government informant in 
United States v. White.67 In White, Harvey Jackson met with the 
suspect and broadcast their conversations to government agents 
by radio.68 One meeting between Jackson and White occurred in 
White’s residence.69 Sharing confidences, even in one’s own 
home, did not persuade the Court to find a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in these communications because, 
“however strongly a defendant may trust an apparent 
colleague,” such beliefs “are not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment when it turns out that the colleague is a 
government agent regularly communicating with the 
authorities.”70 White declared that anyone considering an illegal 
act “must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting 
 
 61. Id. at 295–96. See also id. at 296 n.3 (“Hoffa explained [to Partin] ‘that 
they was going to get to one juror or try to get to a few scattered jurors and take 
their chances.’”). 
 62. Id. at 296 n.3. 
 63. Id. at 300. 
 64. Id. at 303 (citing Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
 65. Id. at 302. 
 66. Id. 
 67. United States v. White 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
 68. Id. at 746–47. 
 69. Id. at 747. 
 70. Id. at 749. 
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to the police.”71 If the would-be wrongdoer “has no doubts, or 
allays them, or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his.”72 
The guidance that On Lee, Hoffa, and White offer to those 
who use social media is not entirely clear. In one sense, Twitter 
and Facebook users are in a weaker position than the defendants 
in the false friends cases. Whether seen as friends, 
acquaintances, or criminal colleagues, the suspects in On Lee, 
Hoffa, and White shared information with another person 
believing that any confidence would remain private. In contrast, 
those on social media are purposely posting information for 
others—whether friends or the general public—to consume. If 
the Court would not extend Fourth Amendment protection to 
incriminating statements uttered face-to-face behind the closed 
doors of the home, it certainly will not safeguard 
communications broadcast on the Internet. 
However, predictive surveillance might result in an 
intrusion beyond that suffered in On Lee, Hoffa, and White 
because it collects information on future communications based 
on previous contacts.73 Social media users would not have the 
option of avoiding further privacy invasion by simply ending a 
conversation or refusing a friend her next entry into the home.74 
Even if a Twitter or Facebook user blocks or un-friends someone, 
or chooses to leave the social media platform entirely, the 
government could employ predictive surveillance to collect 
information foretelling the user’s future behavior.75 
Further, language in White could offer a new tack to take in 
these cases. The White Court noted that the Court of Appeals in 
its case had “understood Katz to render inadmissible against 
White the agents’ testimony concerning conversations that 
Jackson broadcast to them.”76 Rejecting the Court of Appeals’ 
reasoning, the Court refused to equate the surveillance in Katz 
to that of White because, “Katz involved no revelation to the 
 
 71. Id. at 752. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Bagrow, Liu & Mitchell, supra note 4, at 125 (“As few as 8–9 of an 
individual’s contacts are sufficient to obtain predictability compared with that 
of the individual alone.”). 
 74. See id. at 122 (arguing that the model presented can accurately “profile” 
individuals based solely off previous contacts, without any current data on the 
person). 
 75. See id. at 123 (presenting data showing “[r]epeated, accurate 
predictions of a future words . . . ”). 
 76. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971). 
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Government by a party to conversations with the defendant.”77 
White rejected the contention that anyone had a reasonable 
privacy expectation that “a person with whom he is conversing 
will not then or later reveal the conversation to the police.”78 
With the advent of predictive surveillance, a social media user’s 
contacts, of course, do indeed make “revelations” to the police 
about the user’s future behavior simply by responding to the 
user’s posts. The revelations, however, are made without the 
intention presupposed by the White Court. Chin Poy, Ed Partin, 
and Harvey Jackson deliberately collected their respective 
conversations, intending to directly relay them to the 
government. No such intentional collection would exist in the 
case of predictive surveillance.79 One might need to reasonably 
assume the risk that the person to which one shares a confidence 
might choose, for her own reasons, to purposely share this 
information with the police.80 However, a social media user 
might not reasonably be expected to weigh the risk that her 
contacts’ usual interactions on social media would leave a 
mathematical trace that the government could use to divine 
future conduct. 
The potential persuasiveness of such reasoning is open to 
question. Ultimately, anyone seeking Fourth Amendment 
protection against predictive surveillance of social media would 
come up against decades of precedent in which the Court has 
consistently held that confidences to friends and acquaintances 
are not protected.81 In the past, government technology 
sophisticated enough to foil a suspect’s calculations in assuming 
risk, such as wearing a wire, did not change the Court’s 
rulings.82 Thus, those using social media will likely receive no 
protection from On Lee, Hoffa, and White. 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 749 (1952) (describing Chin 
Poy as an “undercover agent” for the Bureau of Narcotics); Hoffa v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 293, 296 (1966) (noting Ed Partin was a police informant); see 
also White, 401 U.S. at 746–47 (referring to Harvey Jackson as a “government 
informant”). 
 80. See Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 303 (affirming that people assume the risk that 
their close confidants might become a police informant). 
 81. The Court decided On Lee in 1952 and White in 1971. On Lee, 343 U.S. 
747; White, 401 U.S. 745. 
 82. See On Lee, 343 U.S. at 754 (discussing how Chin Poy and the Bureau 
of Narcotics used a transmitter and receiver to listen to On Lee’s conversations); 
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B. A FORMER USER OF SOCIAL MEDIA CLAIMING FOURTH 
AMENDMENT PRIVACY AGAINST GOVERNMENT EXPLOITATION OF 
HER CONTACTS COULD RESURRECT “TARGET” STANDING AS 
PARTICULARLY APT FOR PREDICTIVE SURVEILLANCE 
Persons wishing to contest predictive surveillance will have 
to contend with the Court’s Fourth Amendment precedent 
regarding “standing.”83 Standing is the doctrine that states, “a 
person must have a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest in 
the place searched before seeking relief for an unconstitutional 
search.”84 At first blush, the Court’s “standing” stance would 
undermine any claim of Fourth Amendment protection against 
predictive surveillance. In the seminal standing case, Rakas v. 
Illinois, the Court unequivocally ruled that the “capacity to 
claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment” depended on 
“whether the person who claims the protection of the 
Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
invaded place.”85 Arguing that one has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in posts on social media seems doomed at the outset. 
However, as with many matters, the devil is in the details. 
In Rakas, the defendants were passengers in an automobile 
in which police found “a box of rifle shells in the glove 
compartment, which had been locked, and a sawed-off rifle 
under the front passenger seat.”86 Even though the defendants 
conceded they did not own the car, rifle, or shells, they moved to 
suppress this evidence as recovered in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.87 The prosecutor responded that the defendants 
lacked standing to complain about a Fourth Amendment 
violation.88 Noting that each application of the exclusionary rule 
blocked relevant evidence from court and therefore exacted a 
“substantial social cost,” Rakas deemed Fourth Amendment 
 
White, 401 U.S. at 746–47 (describing how Jackson used a radio transmitter so 
the police could listen to White’s conversations). 
 83. See generally Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1979) (holding that Fourth 
Amendment rights cannot be vicariously asserted); Byrd v. United States, 138 
S. Ct. 1518, 1530 (2018) (differentiating Fourth Amendment “standing” from 
Article III standing). 
 84. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1530. 
 85. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. 
 86. Id. at 130. 
 87. See id. (outlining the defendant’s arguments in favor of a motion to 
suppress). 
 88. See id. at 131 (outlining the prosecutor’s response to defendant’s motion 
to suppress). 
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rights as “personal rights” which could “not be vicariously 
asserted.”89 Therefore, vindication of Fourth Amendment rights 
was left to “defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have 
been violated.”90 
Determining the precise identity of those suffering a Fourth 
Amendment violation caused the Court to question “whether it 
serves any useful analytical purpose” to consider standing as a 
concept “distinct from the merits of a defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment claim.”91 In answer, Rakas ruled that standing, 
rather than being some “theoretically separate” inquiry, was 
simply the substantive Fourth Amendment question of “whether 
the challenged search or seizure violated the Fourth 
Amendment rights of a criminal defendant who seeks to exclude 
the evidence obtained during it.”92 Thus, when a person is 
contesting a search, the proper “standing” analysis applies 
Katz’s test: “whether the person who claims the protection of the 
[Fourth] Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the invaded place.”93 Since the defendants in Rakas “made no 
showing that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the glove compartment or area under the seat of the car in which 
they were merely passengers,” their Fourth Amendment claims 
failed.94 
In using Katz to assess standing, Rakas explicitly rejected a 
“target” test offered by the defendants.95 Target standing would 
enable “any criminal defendant at whom a search was ‘directed’” 
to contest the legality of the search because she was the “victim” 
of the police intrusion.96 Rakas found target standing 
 
 89. Id. at 133–34, 137.   
 90. Id. at 134. 
 91. Id. at 138. 
 92. Id. at 140; see also id. at 139 (declaring that standing should instead be 
“more properly subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine”). Cf. 
Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1530 (2018) (softening the court’s prior 
rejection of “standing” as a doctrine separate from the substantive Fourth 
Amendment inquiry and noting that Rakas urged that “standing” should not be 
viewed as “distinct” from the Fourth Amendment “merits” of a case); Byrd, 138 
S. Ct. at 1530 (conceding that, “[t]he concept of standing in Fourth Amendment 
cases can be a useful shorthand for capturing the idea that a person must have 
a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest in the place searched before seeking 
relief for an unconstitutional search . . . .”). 
 93. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1979). 
 94. Id. at 148. 
 95. Id. at 132–134. 
 96. Id. at 132. 
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problematic because it would disregard the personal nature of 
Fourth Amendment rights by allowing “a defendant to assert 
that a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of a third party” 
supported suppression of evidence.97 
There is perhaps one context in which Rakas’s concerns 
about target standing would not exist—predictive surveillance. 
Target standing’s failure in enabling a person to assert someone 
else’s Fourth Amendment rights to exclude evidence would not 
occur with predictive surveillance.98 Were police to view the 
online posts of a person’s contacts in order to predict that user’s 
future conduct, the officers would not be violating the reasonable 
expectations of privacy of the contacts because no privacy 
expectations would exist in such public behavior.99 The 
“targeted” user therefore would not be relying on the “search” of 
her contacts as third parties. Instead, the user would be claiming 
that law enforcement was gathering information about her own 
future conduct, even in circumstances where she had opted out 
of any social media entirely. Unlike prior defendants that have 
attempted to employ target standing, the only Fourth 
Amendment right a social media user subjected to predictive 
surveillance would be vindicating would be her own. 
Target standing in predictive search cases would not only 
avoid the concerns raised in Rakas, but also provide the simplest 
theory to directly address the “programmatic purpose” behind 
law enforcement’s predictive policing.100 While Whren v. United 
States refused to consider an officer’s subjective motivations 
relevant to a Fourth Amendment inquiry,101 later decisions have 
examined subjective intent in the context of an agency’s 
“programmatic purpose” in the “general scheme” of its 
institutional behavior.102 In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the 
 
 97. Id. at 133. 
 98. Id. at 132–134. 
 99. Id. at 148. See also Brian Mund, Social Media Searches and the 
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 19 YALE J. L. & TECH. 238, 241–247 (2017) 
(arguing there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in social media posts 
because of the third-party doctrine and voluntary sharing). 
 100. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45–46 (2000) (noting 
that absent individualized suspicion, courts would look into programmatic 
purposes to determine the validity of Fourth Amendment intrusions). 
 101. The Whren Court noted, “[W]e have been unwilling to entertain Fourth 
Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of individual officers.” 
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
 102. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45–46. 
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Court found that a drug checkpoint program, operated without 
“reasonable suspicion or probable cause,”103 violated the Fourth 
Amendment.104 This was in spite of the fact that the Court had 
upheld suspicionless checkpoint programs in the past.105 The 
fatal flaw in Indianapolis’ checkpoint program was its 
“programmatic purpose,” which was “the discovery and 
interdiction of illegal narcotics.”106 Since the city’s aim was “to 
uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” performing 
these checkpoint stops without any Fourth Amendment 
individualized suspicion violated the Fourth Amendment.107 If a 
law enforcement agency collects information on a user’s contacts 
in order to predict that user’s future behavior, it would be fair to 
say that the programmatic purpose of this intrusion “targets” 
the individual user rather than the contacts. This 
characterization is the most apt and clear description of police 
actions in predictive surveillance and therefore the most likely 
to inform the Fourth Amendment inquiry. 
Target standing, when applied to predictive surveillance, 
would also effectively answer the two issues Rakas mandated 
that standing address: “first, whether the proponent of a 
particular legal right has alleged an ‘injury in fact,’ and, second, 
‘whether the proponent is asserting his own legal rights and 
interests rather than basing his claim for relief upon the rights 
of third parties.’”108 As to Rakas’ first inquiry, with predictive 
surveillance, the person who genuinely suffers an “injury in fact” 
is the target of the mathematical algorithms anticipating her 
behavior, not the users still posting messages online.109 The user 
who has retreated from all social media suffers direct injury from 
predictive surveillance because she is still being pursued by 
police, regardless of her every effort to regain privacy. As to 
Rakas’ second question, the victim of predictive surveillance 
rightly identifies the right implicated as her “own” because it is 
her private future that law enforcement is probing. Predictive 
 
 103. Id. at 35. 
 104. Id. at 48. 
 105. See id. at 34 (noting that the Supreme Court had held that “brief, 
suspicionless seizures at highway checkpoints for the purposes of combating 
drunk driving and intercepting illegal immigrants were constitutional”). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 42. 
 108. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1979). 
 109. Id. 
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surveillance’s fulfillment of Rakas’s own two criteria for 
answering the key questions for standing provides still further 
evidence for employing target standing in this unique context. 
C. A REINTERPRETATION OF COURT PRECEDENT REGARDING A 
HOMEOWNER’S RIGHT TO PRIVACY, WHEN VIEWED WITH COURT 
RULINGS ON COLLECTION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, COULD 
PROVIDE THE STRONGEST ARGUMENT FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT 
PROTECTION AGAINST PREDICTIVE SURVEILLANCE OF SOCIAL 
MEDIA 
Any law enforcement agency using predictive surveillance 
would likely argue that, rather than intruding directly on the 
communications of the targeted individual, the government is 
merely collecting the current messages of each person who had 
previously communicated with the target.110 As noted in the last 
section, the Court currently has little patience for those 
complaining about government intrusions on persons other than 
themselves.111 Another potential path to Fourth Amendment 
protection could be established by considering three cases 
spanning half a century: Alderman v. United States,112 Riley v. 
California,113 and Carpenter v. United States.114 
In Alderman, the Court protected an individual against 
government intrusion on communications even though the 
person himself was not a participant in those conversations.115 
After appellate courts affirmed the convictions for “conspiring to 
 
 110. See Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Government Access to and 
Manipulation of Social Media: Legal and Policy Changes, 61 HOWARD L. J. 523, 
547 (2018) (discussing the case of United States v. Meregildo in which the court 
held police using a target’s online friends to survey communications was not 
violation of the Fourth Amendment). See also Christopher Raleigh Bousquet, 
Why Police Should Monitor Social Media to Prevent Crime, WIRED (Apr. 20, 
2018), https://www.wired.com/story/why-police-should-monitor-social-media-
to-prevent-crime/ (arguing for increased police use of social media monitoring 
to predict crime and discussing the legal ramifications of doing so). 
 111. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 132–134 (rejecting “target” standing which 
would allow someone to assert another’s Fourth amendment rights). 
 112. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). 
 113. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
 114. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 115. See Alderman, 394 U.S. at 176 ( holding that defendant was entitled to 
Fourth Amendment protections “if the United States unlawfully overheard 
conversations of a petitioner himself or conversations occurring on his premises, 
whether or not he was present or participated in those conversations”). 
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transmit murderous threats in interstate commerce,”116 the 
Court learned that the United States, potentially in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment, “had engaged in electronic 
surveillance”117 of Alderisio’s business premises in Chicago.118 
Alderman framed the issues as follows: 
What standards are to be applied in determining whether each 
petitioner has standing to object to the use against him of the 
information obtained from the electronic surveillance of petitioner 
Alderisio’s place of business? More specifically, does petitioner 
Alderisio have standing to object to the use of any or all information 
obtained from such electronic surveillance whether or not he was 
present on the premises or party to a particular overheard 
conversation?119 
The Court therefore considered whether a person has 
standing to contest government intrusions into conversations in 
which he is not a party. Alderman reaffirmed “the general rule 
that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights”120 which 
could “not be vicariously asserted.”121 The Court further 
reiterated, “suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment 
violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights 
were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved 
solely by the introduction of damaging evidence.”122 
After explicitly restating the personal nature of Fourth 
Amendment rights, Alderman declared that a violation would 
occur “if the United States unlawfully overheard conversations 
of a petitioner himself or conversations occurring on his 
premises, whether or not he was present or participated in those 
conversations.”123 The Court defended its ruling from dissenting 
Justices Harlan and Stewart, who objected “to our protecting the 
homeowner against the use of third-party conversations 
overheard on his premises.”124 The Court rejected the dissent’s 
 
 116. Id. at 167. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See id. (“[P]etitioners alleged they had recently discovered that 
Alderisio’s place of business in Chicago had been the subject of electronic 
surveillance by the Government.”). See also United States v. Alderisio, 424 F.2d 
20 at 21 n.2 (specifying that the government electronically monitored “the 
Gaylur Mercantile Company and the First National Mortgage Company”). 
 119. Alderman 394 U.S. at n.2. 
 120. Id. at 174. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 171–72. 
 123. Id. at 176 (emphasis added). 
 124. Id. 
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position that “unless the conversational privacy of the 
homeowner himself is invaded, there is no basis in the Fourth 
Amendment for excluding third-party conversations overheard 
on his premises.”125 Alderman noted that if the government had 
illegally seized “tangible property belonging to third parties—
even a transcript of a third-party conversation”126 the 
homeowner would be able to contest the search simply because 
the evidence was the fruit of “an unauthorized search of his 
house, which is itself expressly protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.”127 The Court warned that the dissent would allow 
officers to enter a “house without consent and without a warrant, 
install a listening device, and use any overheard third-party 
conversations against the owner in a criminal case, in spite of 
the obvious violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be secure 
in his own dwelling.”128 Alderman rejected this approach, noting, 
The rights of the owner of the premises are as clearly invaded when 
the police enter and install a listening device in his house as they are 
when the entry is made to undertake a warrantless search for tangible 
property; and the prosecution as surely employs the fruits of an illegal 
search of the home when it offers overheard third-party conversations 
as it does when it introduces tangible evidence belonging not to the 
homeowner, but to others.129 
Therefore, Alderman explicitly established that, in certain 
circumstances, the Fourth Amendment protected “third party 
conversations” even if the persons seeking privacy were not 
themselves involved in the overheard conversations.130 The 
rationale supporting the protection, however, was based on the 
privacy rights of the homeowner.131 Kyllo v. United States, a case 
involving government use of technology to intrude into a house, 
noted the special status of the home in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.132 Kyllo noted that, when it came to privacy, the 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 177. 
 128. Id. at 178. 
 129. Id. at 179–80 (emphasis added). 
 130. See id. at 180 (“[C]onversations as well as property are excludable from 
the criminal trial when they are found to be the fruits of an illegal invasion of 
the home.”). 
 131. See id. at 179 (“We adhere to the established view in this Court that the 
right to be secure in one’s house against unauthorized intrusion is not limited 
to protection against a policeman viewing or seizing tangible property . . . .”). 
 132. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“‘At the very core’ of 
the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home 
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“Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the 
house.’”133 This was because “[i]n the home, our cases show, all 
details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe 
from prying government eyes.”134 
While persons subject to predictive surveillance of their 
Twitter contacts may send some of their tweets from home, they 
cannot rely on the privacy of their premises as did Alderisio in 
the Alderman case. Such Twitter users send their messages to 
the Internet, a domain outside of the physical home. The Court, 
however, has recently determined, in Riley v. California, that 
some information in the digital realm has a privacy interest 
comparable to that in the home.135 Riley involved officers looking 
through cellphones obtained from two arrestees.136 In Riley’s 
first case, police, after arresting David Riley for “possession of 
concealed and loaded firearms,”137 located photographs on his 
phone showing Riley standing in front of a car suspected of being 
connected with an earlier shooting.138 In the second case, police 
caught Brima Wurie apparently selling drugs.139 A search of 
Wurie’s “flip phone” ultimately led to police seizing drugs and 
guns from an address found on the phone.140 When the police in 
both cases justified their collection of cellphone evidence as 
obtained by search incident to arrest, the Court refused to 
extend this search warrant exception to digital information.141 
 
and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’”) (quoting 
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). Kyllo involved 
government “use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a 
public street to detect relative amounts of heat within.” Id. at 29. 
 133. Id. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)). 
 134. Id. at 37. 
 135. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396–97 (2014) (“[A] cell phone 
search would typically expose to the government far more than the most 
exhaustive search of a house . . . .”). 
 136. Id. at 378–79, 380. 
 137. Id. at 378. 
 138. See id. at 379 (explaining that while “there was ‘a lot of stuff’ on the 
phone, particular files . . . ‘caught [the detective’s] eye . . . ’”). 
 139. See id. at 380 (“[A] police officer performing routine surveillance 
observed respondent Brima Wurie make an apparent drug sale from a car.”). 
 140. See id. at 381 (specifying that police “found and seized 215 grams of 
crack cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a firearm and ammunition, and 
cash”). 
 141. See id. at 386 (holding that the general exception to the warrant 
requirement for searches incident to arrest did not extend to data on cell 
phones). 
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In assessing searches of smartphones incident to arrest, 
Riley drew a distinct line between “physical objects,” such as a 
package of cigarettes,142 and the “digital content on cell 
phones.”143 A search of a cellphone gave the government access 
to such “vast quantities of personal information” that it bore 
“little resemblance” to traditional searches of physical items.144 
Riley declared that equating searches of physical objects and 
cellphones “is like saying a ride on horseback is materially 
indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of 
getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping 
them together.”145 The Court therefore put digital information 
stored on devices such as smartphones in an entirely separate 
“category” with protections “far beyond” such physical items as 
“a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”146 In doing so, Riley 
equated the privacy interest in a smartphone with that in the 
home: 
[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the government far more 
than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains 
in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it 
also contains a broad array of private information never found in a 
home in any form—unless the phone is.147 
The digital information stored in a smartphone was 
therefore of such a great capacity and sensitivity that the Court 
found it rivaled or exceeded the privacy interests in the home—
the Fourth Amendment’s “core.”148 
The digital information on a cellphone shares many 
similarities with the digital information found in social media 
accounts online. Riley noted that smartphones “could just as 
easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, 
tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or 
 
 142. Id. at 383–386. 
 143. Id. at 386. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 393. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 396–97. 
 148. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001). The court has 
asserted, “‘At the very core’ of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a man 
to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion.’” Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). 
Further, the Justices have recognized that a search of the home implicates one 
of the “core areas of privacy.” California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 405 (1985) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 
(1977)). 
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newspapers.”149 Social media fulfills many of these same 
functions. Facebook, by allowing the sharing of photos and 
videos, fulfills the functions of cameras, videos players, and tape 
recorders. Instead of a Rolodex and a calendar, Facebook has a 
“friends” list and an “events” feature. Facebook’s timeline and 
Instagram’s profile and stories are analogous to diaries. Finally, 
these services have newsfeeds, which users share and over 
which they debate. Indeed, the main difference between social 
media and the collection of devices Riley listed in smartphones 
is that social media combines and amplifies these various 
functions to create a more immersive, perhaps even addictive, 
experience.150 Using these services therefore might cause us to 
expose more of ourselves than we ever would in a mere calendar 
or Rolodex. 
Further, Riley declared that cellphones “are now such a 
pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial 
visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important 
feature of human anatomy.”151 To say that social media is 
pervasive would be an understatement; Twitter has recently 
reported having “126 million daily active users” while Facebook 
has logged in at “1.2 billion daily users.”152 For perspective, the 
number of Twitter users exceeds the population of Mexico in 
2018 (estimated at over 125 million for July 2020)153 and the 
number of Facebook users is well over three times the population 
of the United States in 2018 (estimated at over 327 million for 
July 1, 2019).154 Further, much of the very pervasiveness and 
 
 149. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014). 
 150. See Social Media Addiction, ADDICTION CTR., 
https://www.addictioncenter.com/drugs/social-media-addiction/ (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2020) (explaining a percentage of users become addicted to social 
media). 
 151. Riley, 573 U.S. at 385. Riley also wondered at the “pervasiveness that 
characterizes cell phones,” noting that the person not carrying a cellphone was 
the “exception” in our society. Id. at 395. 
 152. Hamza Shaban, Twitter Reveals Its Daily Active User Numbers for the 
First Time, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2019, 10:43 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/02/07/twitter-reveals-its-
daily-active-user-numbers-first-time. 
 153. Cent. Intelligence Agency, Mexico, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (Feb. 5, 
2020), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/mx.html. 
 154. U.S. Census Bureau, QuickFacts: United States, CENSUS.GOV, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045218 (last visited Feb. 
20, 2020). 
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insistency Riley noted about smartphones came from the fact 
that they performed a function much like modern social 
media.155 Social media is so firmly rooted in our daily lives that 
seventy percent of respondents in a Wall Street Journal/NBC 
News survey reported that they “check in daily.”156 Therefore, if 
Riley worried that an officer’s opening of a cellphone would 
permit deep and broad access to many aspects of a person’s life, 
no less a concern is presented by government entry into an 
individual’s online activity. 
Finally, Riley noted that cellphone owners “keep on their 
person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives—from 
the mundane to the intimate.”157 The same could be said of the 
digital record left by social media users who likewise share the 
mundane, such as a plate of food at a restaurant, and the 
intimate, whether it be relationship statuses or health updates. 
When Riley worried that the “sum of an individual’s private life” 
on cellphones could “be reconstructed through a thousand 
photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions,” the 
Court could have been discussing the timeline of Facebook or the 
profile and stories of Instagram.158 This, in a sense, is the very 
purpose of Facebook—to construct a version of one’s life. Finally, 
Riley was troubled by the fact that “the data on a phone can date 
back to the purchase of the phone, or even earlier.”159 Similarly, 
the data in social media accounts, stored in the Cloud, continue 
to exist over the years from one’s first post.160 Moreover, the 
predictive surveillance revealed by Bagrow and his peers 
presents a danger not even contemplated by Riley—that the 
 
 155. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014) ( “The term ‘cell phone’ 
is itself misleading shorthand; many of these devices . . . .could just as easily be 
called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, 
diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.”). 
 156. John D. McKinnon & Danny Dougherty, Americans Hate Social Media 
But Can’t Give It Up, WSJ/NBC News Poll Finds, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5, 2019, 
5:30 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/americans-agree-social-media-is-
divisive-but-we-keep-using-it-11554456600. 
 157. Riley, 573 U.S. at 395. 
 158. Id. at 394. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See How Long Does Your Data Remain on the Internet, VTNV SOL.’S 
LTD. (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.le-vpn.com/long-data-remain-internet/ 
(explaining that data uploaded to social media “may be searchable forever” and 
that data storage in the Cloud means that “in most cases data you upload, 
access, store, and use will at some point get used by, stored and saved on some 
third party server”). 
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government could conceivably obtain information not only about 
a person’s past behavior, but her future.161 
The argument for social media privacy from predictive 
surveillance is strengthened when Alderman and Riley are 
combined with Carpenter v. United States, a case involving 
government collection of the location information of 
cellphones.162 As Carpenter explained, today’s smartphones 
“continuously scan” their environment to gain “the best signal, 
which generally comes from the closest cell site.”163 Every time 
a “phone connects to a cell site, it generates a time-stamped 
record known as cell-site location information (CSLI).”164 This 
process occurs automatically, regardless of whether a person is 
using the phone or not.165 In 2011, police in Detroit exploited this 
technology to connect Timothy Carpenter to a series of 
robberies.166 Armed with a federal court order directing 
MetroPCS and Sprint to provide CSLI for Carpenter’s phone, the 
government gathered “12,898 location points cataloging 
Carpenter’s movements—an average of 101 data points per day” 
for up to 152 days.167 Prosecutors used this evidence to place 
Carpenter’s phone “near four of the charged robberies.”168 Since 
this evidence demonstrated that Carpenter was “right where 
the . . . robbery was at the exact time of the robbery,” it “clinched 
the case.”169 
The Carpenter Court was clearly uncomfortable with the 
power of CSLI, warning, “technology has enhanced the 
Government’s capacity to encroach upon areas normally guarded 
from inquisitive eyes.”170 The Court worried about people being 
“at the mercy of advancing technology”171 and of a “too 
permeating police surveillance.”172 Carpenter therefore aimed to 
preserve “that degree of privacy against government that existed 
 
 161. See Hutson, supra note 3 (explaining that computer scientists can 
predict the content of future postings). 
 162. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 163. Id. at 2211. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 2212. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 2213. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 2214. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)). 
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when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”173 The Court 
reiterated that the Fourth Amendment was meant “to secure 
‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power’”174 and recalled 
that the founders crafted this right to protect against British 
officers committing “unrestrained” searches.175 
Carpenter was particularly alarmed by the intrusiveness 
and pervasiveness of CSLI technology. Collection of CSLI 
enabled the government to easily create an “exhaustive chronicle 
of location information” detailing where a person was,176 on 
average, every quarter hour for months or years at a time.177 
Carpenter emphasized that the “cell phone location information 
is detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.”178 The Court 
therefore ruled, “when the Government accessed CSLI from the 
wireless carriers, it invaded Carpenter’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the whole of his physical movements.”179 Carpenter 
held, “[t]he Government’s acquisition of the cell-site records was 
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”180 
The Court found CSLI was protected by the Fourth 
Amendment despite the public nature of the information. A 
smartphone user “continuously reveals his location to his 
wireless carrier” and therefore shares the whereabouts of his 
phone with a third party, the cell service provider.181 Carpenter 
acknowledged that earlier precedent, starting with United 
States v. Miller,182 had created the “third-party doctrine” which 
refused to find a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information shared with another person or entity.183 
Specifically, the Court conceded, “[w]e have previously held that 
‘a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information 
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he voluntarily turns over to third parties.’”184 Therefore, the 
defendant in Miller lacked any reasonable expectation of 
privacy, and therefore a Fourth Amendment claim, in the 
“canceled checks, deposit slips, and monthly statements” the 
government sought by subpoena because he had shared such 
information with his bank, a third party.185 Similarly, in Smith 
v. Maryland,186 when the government used a “pen register” to 
collect the numbers a caller dialed in placing a phone call, the 
Court found the caller lacked a reasonable privacy expectation 
in these dialed numbers.187 The phone caller had squandered his 
privacy by voluntarily conveying this information “to a telephone 
company.”188 
Carpenter found Miller and Smith did not limit a 
smartphone user’s privacy in CSLI.189 Even though a 
smartphone user’s continuous exposure of “his location to his 
wireless carrier” implicated Miller and Smith’s “third-party 
principle,” it was not clear to the Court that this doctrine’s “logic 
extend[ed] to the qualitatively different category of cell-site 
records.”190 Quite simply, CSLI’s “detailed and comprehensive 
record” of a phone user’s movements191 dwarfed the information 
obtained by the “limited capabilities” of the old-fashioned pen 
register.192 Carpenter concluded: “Given the unique nature of cell 
phone location records, the fact that the information is held by a 
third party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth 
Amendment protection.”193 
Due to the invasiveness of predictive surveillance, the Court 
might someday follow Carpenter’s lead, finding Fourth 
Amendment protection against this intrusion despite the fact 
that social media users have shared information with others. 
With both CSLI and platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, 
technology has crafted “an intimate window into a person’s life,” 
revealing “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
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associations,” and therefore the “privacies of life.”194 While CSLI 
provided “an all-encompassing record of the holder’s 
whereabouts,” predictive surveillance arguably intrudes even 
further by building an all-encompassing record of a person’s 
online statements, and therefore, her thoughts.195 While 
Carpenter fretted about wireless carriers’ retention of a person’s 
movements “every moment of every day for five years,”196 
Twitter and other social media platforms hold records of 
personal behavior beyond a mere five years.197 Facebook even 
has a legacy option for deceased Facebook users, making the use 
of an account last beyond a lifetime.198 Carpenter was alarmed 
that CSLI gave the government “easy, cheap, and efficient” 
access to a “deep repository” of historical information with “just 
a click of a button.”199 These same concerns could exist with 
predictive surveillance’s exploitation of social media platforms. 
Of particular interest for predictive surveillance issues are 
Carpenter’s concerns regarding the time-traveling nature of 
CSLI. The Court recognized that CSLI surveillance had a 
“retrospective quality” which gave law enforcement access “to a 
category of information otherwise unknowable.”200 CSLI enabled 
the government to “travel back in time to retrace a person’s 
whereabouts.”201 CSLI’s ability to “chronicle a person’s past 
movements” forced the Court to “confront” a “new phenomenon,” 
a kind of surveillance the government previously “simply could 
not” perform.202 CSLI time-travel is based on the fact that 
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wireless providers continually log location information “for all of 
the 400 million devices in the United States.”203 Police therefore 
need not “know in advance whether they want to follow a 
particular individual or when.”204 Having the luxury of knowing 
that information is being continuously collected, law 
enforcement can go back in time whenever it wishes to tail any 
individual for “every moment of every day” for a matter of 
years.205 With predictive surveillance, social media users would 
be subject to the same kind of “tireless and absolute 
surveillance.”206 Predictive surveillance, however, could be even 
more intrusive than CSLI because this new technology delves 
into not only a person’s past but also her future. The Court could 
rightly ask how a person could reasonably anticipate the 
exposure of her future interactions with others, particularly the 
government, when she herself cannot even divine this “otherwise 
unknowable” frontier.207 
Another reason that Carpenter refused to apply Miller and 
Smith’s third-party doctrine to CSLI involved voluntariness. 
When Miller did his banking, he chose to share his checks and 
deposit slips with the bank.208 When Smith dialed his phone, he 
likewise meant to share his phone number with the phone 
company.209 Carpenter, when passively possessing his 
smartphone, did not similarly commit “voluntary exposure” 
because cellphones have become “such a pervasive and insistent 
part of daily life” that carrying one is indispensable to 
participation in modern society.”210 Unless one committed the 
extreme step of “disconnecting the phone from the network, 
there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location 
data.”211 Carpenter therefore concluded, “in no meaningful sense 
does the user voluntarily ‘assume the risk’ of turning over a 
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comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.”212 Many 
would argue that social media—in keeping users in touch with 
friends and loved ones, alerting them to the latest news, offering 
the needed escape of a humorous video, and providing birthday 
reminders—has become an equally integral part of society that 
people are loathe to give up. Carpenter also distinguished 
between using a smartphone and voluntarily banking or dialing 
on a landline by noting that CSLI information is collected 
“without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond 
powering up.”213 The Court noted that “[v]irtually any activity 
on the phone,” including social media updates, generates 
CSLI.214 Predictive surveillance exploits this same aspect of 
connectivity; even if a user leaves social media and takes no 
further volitional action, the government can predict future 
behavior by scrutinizing followers—actions of others beyond a 
former user’s control. With CSLI, Carpenter warned, “[a]part 
from disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way 
to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data.”215 Former social 
media users trying to escape the reach of predictive surveillance 
lack even this dire option. 
In holding that government CSLI collection was a search, 
Carpenter revitalized Fourth Amendment protection in public 
places.216 The Court declared, “[a] person does not surrender all 
Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public 
sphere” because what a person “seeks to preserve as private, 
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”217 Such language could bode well for social media 
users who fear an intrusion from predictive surveillance. As 
Carpenter warned, “the Court is obligated—as ‘[s]ubtler and 
more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become 
available to the Government’—to ensure that the ‘progress of 
science’ does not erode Fourth Amendment protections.”218 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In his advanced years, Cicero, the great Roman orator and 
statesman, wrote in his Treatise on Friendship about a friend, 
“What can be more delightful than to have some one to whom 
you can say everything with the same absolute confidence as to 
yourself?”219 Cicero declared, “In the face of a true friend a man 
sees as it were a second self.”220 Cicero could not imagine that, 
with the advent of advanced mathematics scouring social media, 
his statement would take on even greater truth. In the near 
future, the government could, when scrutinizing a person’s 
contacts on social media, create a second version of that original 
user. This statistical construct, from the target’s friends and not 
reliant on any information from the targeted individual, could 
then predict the target’s future conduct.221 
Over half a century ago, government agents in Silverman v. 
United States penetrated a house with a “spike mike” to 
overhear conversations about illegal gambling.222 Silverman 
found this intrusion to violate the Fourth Amendment because 
“[a]t the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his 
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion.”223 The Court refused to allow the government to 
“secretly observe or listen” to what occurs in the home without 
the protection of a Fourth Amendment warrant.224 
Social media, of course, resides not in a person’s home but 
in the Cloud. Riley began to grapple with the reality that people 
now depend on the privacy of information in the digital realm 
much as they do with information in their homes.225 If at the core 
of the Fourth Amendment, a person has the right to “retreat into 
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his own home,”226 an individual should likewise have the 
equivalent right to “retreat” from social media.227 If instead the 
Court in the future allows law enforcement to pursue a person 
by predicting her behavior from others’ posts even after she has 
“retreated” from social media by deleting her account, then it has 
failed to guard against “the seismic shifts in digital 
technology.”228 The Court has already explored doctrines that 
could provide protection against predictive surveillance of a 
social media users’ contacts: target standing, the right of 
homeowners in the privacy of any communications on their 
premises, and the recognition of the need for privacy in digital 
information. Ultimately, privacy in this realm will depend on 
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